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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Linda Muir, Deanna Pfeiffer, Sandra Jenkins, Mark Muir, Mario
Jenkins and Douglas Bailey were plaintiffs in the underlying case
No. 5719. Virginia Low was added as a plaintiff in case No. 5873.
Appellant Evelyn Muir was the only party who appealed from the
dismissals. Douglas Bailey subsequently filed a third action in the
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Civil No.
900903526, not involved in this appeal.
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JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (j) , this Court has
jurisdiction over the appeal from the February 5, 1990, order
dismissing Muir's claims against respondents Apache and Burt. This
Court also has jurisdiction over the appeal from the April 2f 1990,
order dismissing Apache and the April 24, 1990, ruling denying
relief from said order. This Court does not have jurisdiction over
the appeal from the April 17, 1990, order dismissing Muir's claims
against Burt, as no appeal was taken from that order.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did appellant fail to appeal from the trial court's order

in No. 5873 dismissing defendant W. H. Burt Explosives, Inc.?
Standard of Review:

Whether a party has perfected an appeal

is a matter of this Court's jurisdiction.

Albretson v. Judd, 709

P.2d 347, 348 (Utah 1985).
2.

Did the trial court correctly»rule based on undisputed

facts that summons did not issue within three months, as required
by U.R.Civ.P. 4(b) (1988)?
Standard of Review:

The trial court's interpretation of

U.R.Civ.P. 4 (1988) is a question of law reviewed by this Court for
correctness.

Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie and

Bushnell. 789 P.2d 34 37 (Utah App. 1990).
1

3.

Did the trial court correctly rule that appellant's first

action was not "timely commenced" for purposes of the "savings
statute," Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40?
Standard of Review:

The trial court's interpretation of a

statute is a question of law reviewed by this Court for correctness.
Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell, 789 P.2d
34 37 (Utah App. 1990).

STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40.

Effect of failure of action not on

merits.
If any action is commenced within due time and a
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if
the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time
limited either by law or contract for commencing the
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies
and the cause of action survives, his representatives,
may commence a new action within one year after the
reversal or failure.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 3 (1988).

Commencement of action.

(a) How commenced. A civil action is commenced (1) by
filing a complaint with the court, or (2) by the service
of a summons. If the action is commenced by the service
of a summons, the complaint, together with the summons
and proof of service thereof, must be filed within ten
days after such service and a copy of the complaint
shall be served upon or mailed to the defendant if his
address is known; if unknown, a copy must be deposited
with the clerk for him, or the action thus commenced
shall be deemed dismissed and the court shall have no
further jurisdiction thereof; provided, however, that
the foregoing provision shall not change the requirement
2

of § 12-1-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4 (1988).

Process.

(a) Issuance of summons. The summons may be signed and
issued by the plaintiff or his attorney. A summons
shall be deemed to have issued when placed in the hands
of a qualified person for the purpose of service.
Separate summonses may be issued and served.
(b) Time of issuance and service. If an action is
commenced by the filing of a complaint, summons must
issue thereon within three months from the date of such
filing. The summons must be served within one year
after the filing of the complaint or the action will be
deemed dismissed, provided that in any action brought
against two or more defendants in which personal service
has been obtained upon one of them within the year, the
other or others may be served or appear at any time
before trial.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
This is a consolidated appeal from the dismissal of two
wrongful death actions filed by Evelyn Muir. The first action, No.
5719, was dismissed without prejudice when the district court ruled
on undisputed facts that summons had not issued within three months
of the filing of the Complaint.

The second action, No. 5873, was

filed prior to the dismissal of No. 5719, and was dismissed with
prejudice upon the district court's ruling that the first case had
not been timely commenced within the meaning of the "savings
statue," Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40. Muir appealed the dismissal of

3

No. 5719, from which both defendants cross-appealed.

Muir appealed

the second dismissal only as to defendant Apache.
Statement of Facts
1.

This action arises out of an accident on September 5,

1986, in which appellant's husband, Wallace A. Muir, was killed.
2.

Appellant Evelyn Muir and others filed a Complaint on

September 1, 1988, asserting claims for Muir's wrongful death. The
action was designated

as Civil No. 5719.

Rl.l.

(To avoid

confusion, the Record on Appeal for No. 5719 shall be designated as
Rl; the Record on Appeal for No. 5873 shall be designated as R2.)
3.

Approximately one and one-half months after filing the

complaint, appellant's original counsel handed summonses for both
defendants to a runner, with instructions to "hold off on serving
them" until further notice.

(Jackson, p. 43. ) 1

Pursuant to those

instructions, the runner kept both summonses until approximately ten
months later, in July 1989, when appellant's successor counsel
contacted him.

The summons for W. H. Burt was forwarded to the

Grand County Sheriff July 3, 1989, and served on July 6, 1989.
R1.16, R1.20.

The trial court ordered the deposition of Steven Jackson to
be published, R1.203. The deposition was filed with the court, and
is included in the Record on Appeal, but apparently was not
paginated.
Accordingly, reference to the deposition will be
designated as "Jackson."
4

4.

Respondents brought a motion to dismiss the Complaint in

No. 5719 based upon U.R.Civ.P. 4(b) (1988), under which

ff

[i]f an

action is commenced by the filing of an complaint, summons must
issue thereon with three months from the date of such filing.11
R1.22.

In connection with the motion, respondents

took the

deposition of Steven Jackson, the only discovery undertaken by
respondent Burt in either case.
5.

On November 27, 1989, while No. 5719 was still pending,

Muir filed another Complaint, Civil No. 5873, asserting the same
claims as in the other case. R2.1.
6.

On January 5, 1990, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell dismissed

the Complaint in No. 5719 based on the fact that summons did not
issue within the required three months.

The court concluded:

Under this state of facts, there is no doubt in the
Court's mind that the plaintiff did fail to comply with
the provisions of Rule 4, in that the Summons was not
issued as it required under that Rule.
The Rule
requires that the Summons must issue within three months
of the date of the filing of the Complaint, and states
that a Summons shall be deemed to have been issued when
placed in the hands of a qualified person for the
purpose of service. The facts show that Summons was
placed in the hands of a qualified person who was
instructed not to serve the Summons and, therefore, it
was not in the person's hands for the purpose of being
served. To rule otherwise would make the provisions of
Rule 4(b) ineffective and meaningless.
Rl.204-05 (court's emphasis).

5

7.

On February 5, 1990, respondent Apache moved the court

for an order dismissing the second action, No. 5873.

R2.35.

Appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to Apache's motion on
February 16, 1990, R2.73, and Apache filed its reply memorandum on
February 23, 1990. R2.80.
8.

On March 6, 1990, respondent Burt filed a separate motion

to dismiss No. 5873 based upon the grounds that the statute of
limitations had run on the wrongful death claims.

R2.98.

Muir

filed a memorandum in opposition to Burt's motion to dismiss on
March 16, 1990. R2.121.
9.

On March 16, 1990, the District Court issued a ruling on

Apache's motion to dismiss.
language:

The ruling contains the following

"TTIhe Motion of Apache to Dismiss the Complaint and the

Amended Complaint as to them is hereby granted, and the attorney for
Apache is directed to prepare a formal order in accordance with this
opinion."
10.

(Emphasis added.)

R2.132.

Shortly thereafter, Apache submitted a proposed order

dismissing plaintiff's claims against Apache.
did not mention Respondent Burt.

The proposed order

Muir filed an objection to

Apache's proposed order on March 26, 1990. R2.154.
11.

On March 22, 1990, respondent Burt submitted a reply

memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss and a request for
ruling, noting that the court "has already ruled in favor of co6

defendant Apache Powder Company on the same legal grounds raised in
this defendant's motion."
12.

R2.137.

On March 26, 1990, Muir filed a notice to submit for

decision, asking the court to rule on respondent Burt's motion to
dismiss. R2.145.
13.

On April 2, 1990, Judge Bunnell issued a ruling over-

ruling Muir's objection to Apache's proposed order, and indicating
that the order had been signed as submitted.

R2.164.

Muir

subsequently filed a motion for relief from the April 2, 1990,
order.

R2.168.
14.

On April 12, 1990, pursuant to oral instructions from

Judge Bunnell's clerk, counsel for respondent Burt circulated a
proposed order dismissing Muir's claims against Burt, and on April
17, 1990, Judge Bunnell signed Burt's order of dismissal.

A copy

of the order dismissing Burt was sent to all counsel by the district
court. R2.175.
15.

On April 18, 1990, Apache filed a memorandum opposing

Muir's motion for relief from the April 2, 1990, order
plaintiff's claims against Apache.

R2.178.

dismissing

Judge Bunnell issued

a ruling on April 24, 1990, denying Muir's motion for relief from
the order.
16.

R2.188.
On April 27, 1990, Muir filed a notice of appeal from the

district court "of the Order of Dismissal signed by the Honorable
7

Boyd Bunnell, District Court Judge, on the 2nd day of April, 1990,
together with the Court's denial of the motion to set aside the
order on the 24th day of April, 1990."

R2.191.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Muir did not appeal from the dismissal of her claims in No.
5873 against Burt.

The notice of appeal filed by Muir states that

her appeal is from the April 2, 1990, order dismissing respondent
Apache and the April 24, 1990, ruling denying relief from that
order.

The notice does not include the April 17, 1990, order

dismissing Muir's claims against Burt, and as a consequence, this
Court has no jurisdiction over the appeal.
If the merits of Muir's appeal are reached, the district
court's rulings

should be affirmed.

The undisputed

evidence

establishes as a matter of law that summons in No. 5719 was not
placed in the hands of a qualified process server for the purpose
of service within the three-month period required by U.R.Civ.P. 4(b)
(1988). Accordingly, the complaint in No. 5719 was properly "deemed
dismissed."
Muir's failure to comply with Rule 4 negated the effect of
filing her original complaint. The action in No. 5719 was therefore
not "commenced within due time" for purposes of the "savings
statute," Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40.

Consequently, the district

court appropriately dismissed Muir's complaint in No. 5873, which
8

was filed more than two years after the death of Muir's husband•
ARGUMENT
I.

MUIR FAILED TO APPEAL FROM THE ORDER
DISMISSING W. H. BURT IN NO. 5873, AND
THEREFORE THE ORDER IS NOT SUBJECT TO
REVIEW.

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(d) provides that a notice
of appeal "shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof,
appealed from . . . "

Muir's notice of appeal, filed on April 27,

1990, states that Muir is appealing only the April 2, 1990, order
of dismissal and the April 24, 1990, denial of relief from that
order. Those orders expressly concern only respondent Apache. The
order dismissing Burt was entered separately on April 17, 1990. As
demonstrated by the chronology set forth in the above Statement of
Facts, both Muir and respondent Burt treated Burt's motion to
dismiss as distinct from respondent Apache's motion.

For example,

Muir filed a request for ruling on Burt's motion after the Court had
ruled on Apache's motion.

(Statement of Facts, Nos. 9, 12.)

It should be noted that because the April 2, 1990, order
dismissed only Apache, leaving Burt as a remaining defendant, it
appears that the order was not final for purposes of appeal.

The

district court disposed of the remaining claims through its April
17, 1990, order dismissing Burt. A notice of appeal was filed nine
days later, but expressly stated that Muir was appealing only from

9

the April 2, 1990, order (and the April 24, 1990, ruling denying
relief from that order).

"Where several defendants are joined and

separate judgments are entered, a notice of appeal specifically
designating one of these cannot be interpreted to include any other
not mentioned," Welch v. State, 390 P.2d 35, 36 (Nev. 1964); Mabrey
v. Mobil Oil Corp.. 502 P.2d 297, 299 (N.Mex. App.)/ cert, denied,
497 P.2d 742 (N.M. 1972).
This Court addressed an analogous situation in Nunlev v. Stan
Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798 (1964).

In

that case, two judgments were entered against the defendants, who
filed a notice of appeal from the second judgment, which was
determined to be void.

It was conceded by the parties that the

appellant could properly have appealed from the earlier judgment.
This Court held that it could not consider the earlier judgment,
however, as it had not been designated in the notice of appeal.
Distinguishing another case,2 this Court wrote:
In our opinion the Price case is not directly in point
as in reality that case had only one judgment to appeal
and was sufficiently designated in the appeal although
the wrong date was inserted. In the instant case we
have two distinct judgments. These two judgments (i.e.,
December 3, 1962, and January 2, 1963) are quite
different . . . There would be no problem if we were
faced only with when the judgment appealed from was
entered as in the Price case, but here the problem is,
which judgment is final and which is being appealed.
Price v. Western Loan & Savings Co., 35 Utah 379, 100 P. 677
(1909) .

As was stated in the Price case, the object of a notice
of appeal is to advise the opposite party that an appeal
has been taken from a specific judgment in a particular
case. Respondent is entitled to know specifically which
judgment is being appealed. The second judgment being
different than the first and in addition void takes this
case from the realm of a mere clerical error as was
evidently made in the Price case. The date becomes
material in this instance and we are not inclined to
correct appellant's error. Although the judgments are
essentially the same as to Stan Katz individually, in
our opinion respondent would be prejudiced if appellant
were allowed to appeal under the above circumstances.
Id. at 800 (emphasis added).
Application of the above principle is even more appropriate
in this case, where two separate orders were entered in favor of two
separate defendants. If a notice of appeal designating an order in
favor of one defendant is construed to encompass a separate order
governing a second defendant, the right of the second defendant "to
know

specifically

which

judgment

is being

appealed"

will be

impaired.
For those reasons, respondent Burt submits that the order
dismissing appellant's claims against it in No. 5873 is not properly
before this Court. Even if this Court reverses the dismissal in No.
5719, the trial court's dismissal of appellant's identical claims
in No. 5873 will stand.

The order of dismissal in No. 5719, which

provided the basis for the trial court's ruling in No. 5873, is
therefore moot

in relation to this respondent.

Accordingly,

respondent Burt requests this Court to dismiss Muir's appeal as it
11

pertains to Burt.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
MUIR'S COMPLAINT IN NO. 5719 WAS DEEMED
DISMISSED DUE TO NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
U.R.CIV.P. 4(b).
Standard of Review

The district court's interpretation of Rule 4(b) is a question
of law which is reviewed for correctness by this Court.

Western

Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell, 789 P.2d 34 37
(Utah App. 1990).
Discussion
Muir filed her complaint in No. 5719 on September 1, 1988.
A summons dated October 19, 1988, was received by the Grand County,
Utah, Sheriff's office on July 5, 1989, and was served the next day.
Under the version of U.R.Civ.P. 4(b) in effect in September
1988,3

,f

[i]f an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint,

Rule 4(b) was amended effective April 1, 1990, subsequent
to the dismissal of Muir's actions. Appellant does not argue that
the new rule should be applied to her action, but does cite the
"without prejudice" language in the new rule as supportive of her
claims. Contrary to Muir's apparent belief, the result is the same
whether the dismissal is "with prejudice" or "without prejudice."
(See authorities discussed at pp. 19-22 of this Brief, construing
identical federal provision.)
However, to the extent that
application of the amended rule might impair the rights of
respondents, such application would be impermissible in any event.
Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 P.2d 236 (1974).

12

summons must issue thereon within three months from the date of such
filing." A complaint for which summons does not issue within three
months is "deemed dismissed."

Valley Asphalt, Inc. v. Eldon J.

Stubbs Construction Co., 714 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1986); Cook v.
Starkev. 548 P.2d 1268, 1269 (Utah 1976); Dennett v. Powers, 536
P.2d

135, 136

(Utah 1975); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v.

Dietrich. 25 Utah 2d 65, 475 P.2d 1005 (1970).
Muir does not dispute the applicable rule of law.

Instead,

she argues that the summons in question was "issued" on October 19,
1988.

Under U.R.Civ.P. 4(a) (1988), "[a] summons shall be deemed

to have issued when placed in the hands of a qualified person for
the purpose of service."

(Emphasis added.)

It is indisputable, as

the district court ruled, that the summons in question was not
issued until July 1989, approximately ten months after the complaint
was filed.

The testimony of Mr. Jackson, who was employed as a

"runner" for appellant's original attorneys, reveals that the
summonses in question was not given to Mr. Jackson "for purposes of
service." In fact, Mr. Jackson was instructed to hold the summonses
and not to serve them until further notice:
Q
A
Q
A

What did Mr. Schwartz tell you with respect to these
summons with complaints?
I think he told me to hold off for a little bit.
Did he give you any date or deadline as to when he wanted
you to try to get them served?
No.

13

* * *

Q
A
Q

A

Did Mr. Schwartz ever say anything to you about these
summons with complaints after that initial time when he
gave them to you?
No.
So after you received them and had your conversation with
Mr. Schwartz, you didn't talk to anyone about these
particular summons with complaints until Mr. Copier
called?
Right.
* * *

Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A

You mentioned that Mr. Schwartz told you to hold off for
a while.
Yeah, that's all he told me.
Was that the gist of the conversation, or was that
exactly what he said?
That was what he told me. He handed it to me and said,
"Hold off for a while."
Had he done that before on occasion, attorneys had handed
that to you and said, "Hold off for a while"?
He hadn't, but other attorneys have.
Okay, what does that mean to you? Hold off until you get
further word?
Yeah.
Okay. And do they sometimes come back and say, "Never
mind, we've settled the case"?
That's happened before, yeah.
Do they sometimes come back and say, "Never mind, I'll
get somebody else to serve it"?
Yeah, and then they'll give it to, I guess a process
server. Is that what they do full time? A constable,
I guess you'd call them.
* * *

THE WITNESS: He said to hold on. That usually means to hold
onto it until I get further word.
Q
(BY MR. DRANEY) That means you're not to make any effort
to serve it until you get further word, correct?
A
Sometimes, yes.
Q
In this case?
A
I don't know. He'd never came back and said anything.
That was all that was said.
14

Q
A
Q
A
Q
A

So you wouldn't do anything until you heard back from
him, correct?
I was to hold it.
Other than holding it, were you to do anything else?
He didn't say to do anything else.
What was your understanding? You were not to do anything
else?
To hold on until I got further word.

Jackson, p. 43, lines 6-11; pp. 44-45, lines 21-4; pp. 50-51, lines
18-13; pp. 62-63, lines 12-3; Rl. 193-94.
That testimony was corroborated by the affidavit of William
Schwartz, one of Muir's original attorneys.

According to Mr.

Schwartz,
[0]n October 19, 1988, I prepared and executed summonses
for Burt and Apache. After executing the summonses, I
placed them in the hands of Steven F. Jackson, an
employee of Hansen & Anderson, for the purpose of
service of process upon Burt and Apache. At the time
I delivered the summonses to Mr. Jackson, I told him
that I wanted him to serve the summonses and the
Complaint, but I asked him to hold off on service for
a time, because our firm was withdrawing from the case
and the plaintiffs were attempting to locate new counsel
who might want to coordinate service.
R1.159, para. 6.
While Mr. Schwartz's affidavit is conveniently worded to match
the language of U.R.Civ.P. 4(a), the affidavit reveals on its face
that the summons was not issued until approximately July 1989, when
the runner was requested to mail the summons to the Grand County
Sheriff's Office.
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The district court's conclusion is further supported by the
fact that the summonses allegedly given to Mr. Jackson "for the
purpose of service" were for Moab, Utah, and Huntington, New Jersey,
locations

in which Jackson had

never once served

Jackson, p. 50, lines 12-17; Rl. 174-75; Rl. 196.

a summons.

When contacted

by Muir's new counsel, Mr. Jackson simply mailed the documents to
process servers in those locations.

Jackson, p. 52, lines 19-23,

pp. 53-54, lines 18-7.
The district court found, after reviewing the above undisputed
facts, that summons had not been placed in the hands of a qualified
person "for the purpose of service."

Rl. 204-05. As the district

court observed, "[t]o rule otherwise would make the provisions of
Rule 4(b) ineffective and meaningless." Rl. 205. Muir's contention
that the Rule contemplates handing a summons to someone "for purpose
of service at a future date" is insupportable. Allowing an express
instruction not to serve a summons to be considered "issuance" of
the summons would plainly invite abuse, and would be contrary to the
purpose of Rules 3 and 4.

Muir's complaint was filed only a few

days before the two-year wrongful death statute of limitations
expired.

The respondents remained unaware of the lawsuit for an

additional ten months, however, due to Muir's delay in issuing the
summons.

In effect, Muir attempted to extend the statute of

limitations for wrongful death claims to nearly three years instead
16

of two.
It is clear from the language of Rule 4(a)

(1988) that

commencement of an action by filing a complaint is contingent upon
timely notification to defendants.

The obvious goal of Rule 4(a)

is to ensure that plaintiffs are reasonably diligent in pursuing
their claims against a defendant who might otherwise be unaware that
a lawsuit had been filed. In this case, the ten-month delay was due
solely to appellant; service was readily accomplished once the Grand
County Sheriff's office had received the summons and Complaint.
Muir's final argument against affirmance is an assertion that
respondents have "appeared and litigated on the merits."
appellant, p. 8.)
the

record.

(Brief of

That assertion is groundless and contradicted by

"The

distinction

between

general

and

special

appearances has been abolished by the language in Rule 12(b) . . ."
Ted R. Brown & Associates v. Carnes Corp., 547 P.2d 206, 207 (Utah
1976).

Under Rule 12(b), defenses may properly be raised in the

answer or by motion.

Respondents simply moved the district court

to dismiss Muir's complaint for failure to comply with U.R.Civ.P.
4(b), as was done in Cook, supra, Dennett, supra, and Fibreboard,
supra. Furthermore, contrary to appellant's misstatement, the only
discovery of any kind undertaken by respondent Burt consisted of the
deposition of Jackson, which was authorized by the district court
due to the conclusory nature of Jackson's affidavit. R1.94. Burt's
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actions in No. 5719 were thus strictly confined to the narrow issue
of non-compliance with Rule 4.
In light of the unambiguous language of Rules 4(a) and 4(b),
and the undisputed testimony offered by Muir, the trial court's
determination that Muir's complaint in No. 5719 was deemed dismissed
should be affirmed.
III. MUIR'S WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS WERE NOT
COMMENCED WITHIN TWO YEARS OF WALLACE
MUIR'S DEATH AND THEREFORE ARE BARRED BY
U.C.A. § 78-12-28.
Standard of Review
The district court's interpretation of a statute is a question
of law which is reviewed for correctness by this Court.

Western

Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell, 789 P.2d 34 37
(Utah App. 1990).
Discussion
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28, claims for wrongful death
must be brought within two years of the date upon which they accrue.
The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether appellant's claims
arising out of Wallace Muir's death were timely filed.
As noted previously, Muir filed her initial wrongful death
action, No. 5719, shortly before the two-year period elapsed after
her husband's death.

A second action was filed November 27, 1989.

The Complaint in No. 5719 was subsequently dismissed by the district
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court for failure to comply with U.R.Civ.P. 4(b) (1988).
Muir

relies

on Utah

Code Ann.

§78-12-40

(the

"savings

statute") for the argument that her claims are not barred by the
two-year limitation for wrongful death actions.

Section 78-12-40

provides:
If any action is commenced within due time and a
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if
the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time
limited either by law or contract for commencing the
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies
and the cause of action survives, his representatives,
may commence a new action within one year after the
reversal or failure.
(Emphasis added.)
This Court has not addressed the effect on § 78-12-40 of a
dismissal

for non-compliance with U.R.Civ.P.

3 and 4

(1988).

However, case law from other jurisdictions with similar rules
governing commencement of actions supports the conclusion that a
lawsuit which is timely filed under Rule 3, but which is not
followed by timely issuance and service of process under Rule 4, has
not been timely commenced for purposes of a savings statute such as
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed similar
circumstances in Gleason v. McBride. 869 F.2d 688 (2nd Cir. 1989).
In that case, a complaint was filed against the defendants within
the applicable statute of limitations, but the court found that the
19

plaintiffs had not complied with F.R.Civ.P. 4(j) by acting with due
diligence in serving the complaint. The appellate court upheld the
dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint, stating:
The district court also correctly held that "delay in
service of the summons and complaint may nullify the
effect of filing the complaint." See Application of the
Royal Bank of Canada, 33 F.R.D. 296, 299-303 (S.D.N.Y.
1963) (where plaintiff had not served process on
defendant in effect, no action had been commenced and
plaintiff could not engage in discovery procedures).
Id. at 691.
The court held that the delay in serving the complaint "had
the effect of negating the fact that a complaint was ever filed" and
the plaintiffs' action was barred, "[b]ecause in effect no complaint
was filed within the three year statute of limitations. . . . "
The

Seventh

Circuit

Court

of Appeals

reached

Id.

the same

conclusion in Geiaer v. Allen, 850 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1988), in
which the court affirmed the district court's dismissal for failure
to serve within the 120-day period prescribed by Rule 4(j).
holding, the court acknowledged

the preclusive

effect of the

dismissal:
Geiger apparently filed her complaint only one day
prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of
limitations. Therefore, although the trial court's
dismissal was without prejudice, the parties agree that
Geiger's cause of action against Allen is now timebarred. In enacting Rule 4(j), however, Congress
recognized the possibility that a plaintiff's cause of
action would be barred if the statute of limitations
expired prior to the court's dismissal under Rule 4(j).
1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 4434, 4441-42. Thus,
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In so

the fact that Geiger is now effectively precluded from
bringing suit against Allen does not prevent the
operation of Rule 4(j).
Id, at 334 (citations omitted).
The relevant portions of Utah and Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 3 and 4 are virtually identical.
F.R.Civ.P.

As under Utah law,

3 states that an action is commenced by filing a

complaint. F.R.Civ.P. 4 requires service within 120 days (formerly
with "due diligence"), whereas U.R.Civ.P. 4 (1988) required issuance
of summons within three months and service within one year. As the
federal courts have recognized,
[i]t appears to be fairly well settled that Rules 3 and
4, F.R.C.P. must be construed together, and that the
filing of a complaint, when followed by lodging of the
summons or writ in the Marshal's office, will toll the
statute of limitations. (Citations omitted.) See also
Barron and Holtzoff, Fed. Prac. & Proc. , Vol. 1, Sec.
163, pages 277-278, wherein the authors state that the
view adopted by the Federal Courts that the filing of
the complaint under Rule 3 commences the action within
the meaning of the statute of limitations, "is subject
to the qualification that delay in three additional
steps — issuance of summons, delivery to an officer for
service, and service of the summons and complaint on
defendant — may nullify the effect of filing the
complaint."
Hukill v. Pacific and Arctic Railway and Navigation Company, 159
F.Supp. 571, 573-74 (D.Alaska 1958).
The same issue was addressed in Burks v. Griffith, 100 F.R.D.
491,

(N.D.N.Y. 1984).

In Burks, the plaintiffs

filed their

complaint shortly before the statute of limitations ran on their
21

claims, but failed to comply with the 120-day service provision of
Rule 4(j). After dismissing the complaint without prejudice, the
court noted that any attempt to file a new complaint would be barred
by the applicable state statute of limitations.

Analyzing the

relationship between Rules 3 and 4 and statutes of limitation, the
court wrote:
Professor Moore recognized this problem but opined: "If
the applicable statute of limitations is tolled by
filing alone, timely service of process will preserve
the action, but dismissal under Rule 4(j) will result
in the action being time-barred if the statute has run
after the filing of the complaint."
II. J. Moore,
supra, at 4-574.
Id. at 493.
State

courts

construing

rules

regarding

commencement of

actions similar to U.R.Civ.P. 3 have reached the same conclusion.
For example, in Weisburcrh v. McClure Newspapers, Inc., 396 A.2d 1388
(Vt. 1979), "a law suit was commenced by the plaintiff by filing a
complaint" shortly before the expiration of the applicable statute
of limitations.

Pursuant to the Vermont version of Rule 3, the

plaintiff was then required to serve process within 30 days, but
failed to do so.

Based on the statute of limitations, the trial

court dismissed the complaint.

In affirming, the Supreme Court of

Vermont noted that "if the filing of a complaint is to be effective
in tolling the statute of limitations as of that filing date, timely
service under the Rules of Civil Procedure must be accomplished."
22

Id. at 1389.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has also recognized the
fact that failure to comply with Rule 4 service requirements
nullifies the "commencement" of an action under Rule 3. In Everhart
v. Sowers, 306 S.E.2d 472 (N.C.App. 1983), the plaintiff initiated
suit by filing a complaint, and a summons was issued the same day.
However, an error was made on the face of the summons, and
consequently the action was dismissed for lack of valid service of
process.

The Court of Appeals noted that:

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, an action is
commenced by the filing of a complaint or the issuance
of a summons. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 3. Rule 4(a) states,
"Upon the filing of a complaint, summons shall be issued
forthwith, and in any event within five days." Due
process requires that a party be properly notified of
the proceeding against him.
[Citation omitted.] In
order for a summons to serve as proper notification, it
must be issued and served in the manner prescribed by
statute. . . . Where a complaint has been filed and
proper summons does not issue within the five days
allowed under Rule 4, the action is deemed never to have
commenced.
. . . Since proper summons did not issue within the five
days allowed under the rule, the action which plaintiff
alleges was initiated on 3 0 January 1980 is deemed never
to have commenced.
It follows, therefore, that the
statute of limitations was never tolled with respect to
the subject of that complaint.
Id. at 475 (emphasis added). See also Donahue v. Dearborn. 257 A.2d
41

(Conn.Cir. 1969)

(action not properly commenced within the

statute of limitations cannot be resurrected by "savings" statute).
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In each of those cases, which involved rules substantially
similar to U.R.Civ.P. 3 and 4, the courts recognized that filing a
complaint is "commencement" of an action for purposes of a statute
of limitation only if summons is properly issued and served in
accordance with Rule 4.

In this case, due to appellant's failure

to issue summons timely, the wrongful death claims in Civil No. 5719
were not "commenced within due time," and therefore Utah Code Ann.
§78-12-40 does not preserve her claims.
That conclusion is supported by Utah law.

This Court has

consistently held that an action which fails to comply with Rule
4(b) is "deemed dismissed."

Appellant cites two Utah cases in

support of her contention that her complaint was timely commenced.
The first, Askwith v. Ellis, 85 Utah 103, 38 P.2d 757 (1934), was
decided prior to the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
At

that

time, the

applicable

statute

contained

no provision

comparable to Rule 4 (b) and thus is of no precedential value on the
issue.4 Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245 (Utah \L988) , also does not

As the court noted in that case, "There is no provision in
the statute by which an action ceases to exist; by which an action
terminates, ends, is dismissed, automatically dies, or ceases to be
pending, because not speedily and vigorously prosecuted, or because
no summons has been issued or served. It may well be that such a
rule would be advisable, salutary, and just, but it is the duty of
the Legislature and not of the courts to make such the law." Id.,
38 P.2d at 759. The adoption of Rule 4(b), providing that actions
are "deemed dismissed" if summons is not timely issued, would seem
to have resolved the court's concern.
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compel a different result. The sole issue decided in Madsen was
whether the failure to file a prior notice of claim negated the
timely commencement of an action against a governmental entity.
This Court held that it did not, stating:
In Utah, suits are commenced by the filing of a
complaint or the service of a summons, not by the filing
of a notice of claim, which is more properly classified
as a precondition to suit than as the means of
commencing a suit.
Id. at 254.
Unlike the notice provision of the Governmental Immunity Act,
the requirements of Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure do constitute the "means of commencing a suit." The rules
set forth the procedures by which actions may properly be commenced.
Cf. Murdock v. Blake. 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164, 167 (1971)
("Service of summons in conformance with the mode prescribed by
statute is deemed jurisdictional, for it is service of process, not
actual knowledge of the commencement of an action, which confers
jurisdiction. . . . The proper issuance and service of summons is
the means of invoking the jurisdiction of the court and of acquiring
jurisdiction over the defendant . . . " ) ; Fibreboard, supra, at 1006
("the court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the defendants" where
summons was not issued within three months in violation of Rule
4(b)); Garcia v. Garcia. 712 P.2d 288, 290 n. 4 (Utah 1986), and
cases cited therein.
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Allowing parties simply to re-file a complaint after ignoring
service requirements could allow plaintiffs to file a complaint but
delay one year, five years, or ten years before issuing summons,
relying on the knowledge that after a dismissal pursuant to Rule
4(b), they would still have an additional year within which to file
a new complaint.

Such a result would be contrary to the goal of

statutes of limitations to "promote justice by preventing surprise
through revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared."

Myers v.

McDonald,

635

P. 2d

84

(Utah

1981).

Furthermore, a contrary interpretation would render meaningless the
mandate of Rule 4(b) that "summons must issue within three months"
of the filing of a Complaint.

Finally, such a construction would

conflict with the Utah legislature's express mandate that the
savings statute yield to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

See

1951 Utah laws, Ch. 58, pp. 150-51

(savings statute revised,

codified

the

and

re-enacted

"insofar

as

same have

not been

superseded by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as adopted by the
Supreme Court of Utah . . . " ) .
Muir's final argument is a conclusory assertion that the
orders of dismissal violated various constitutional provisions.
(Brief of appellant, p. 14.) However, Muir does not specify in what
manner the dismissals were allegedly unconstitutional, and therefore
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it is not possible to address that contention.

Bare allegations of

unconstitutionality are insufficient to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality recognized by this Court on numerous occasions.
See, e.g., State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987); Utah Farm
Bureau Insurance Co. v. Utah Insurance Guaranty Assn., 564 P.2d 751
(Utah 1977) .
CROSS-APPEAL
Respondent Burt is abandoning its cross-appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, respondent Burt respectfully
requests this Court to dismiss the appeal as it pertains to Burt,
or, in the alternative, to affirm the rulings of the district court.
DATED this y ^

day of December, 1990.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C

u>

Roger P. (jfchristensen
Karra J. Porter
Attorneys for Appellee and
Cross-Appellant W. H. Burt
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ADDENDUM
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

A

RULING ON MOTION OF APACHE POWDER TO DISMISS
THE COMPLAINT AND AMENDED COMPLAINT

A

RULING ON OBJECTION TO ORDER

A

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

A

RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RELIEF
FROM ORDER OF DISMISSAL
NOTICE OF APPEAL

A
A

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
EVELYN MUIR, LINDA MUIR,
DEANNA PFEIFFER, SANDRA
JENKINS, MARK MUIR, MARLO
JENKINS AND DOUGLAS BAILEY,

i
1i
]
]

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,

vs.
W.H. BURT EXPOSIVES, INC.,
a New Mexico corporation
and APACHE POWDER COMPANY,
a New Jersey corporation,

i

Civil No. 5719

Defendants.
The defendants have both filed motions to dismiss
this case contending that the'plaintiff failed to comply with
Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, that summonses were not
issued within three months as required by that Rule,
The Court hereby orders that the Deposition of
Steven F. Jackson be published and used in the disposition of
these motions.

The original Deposition has not been filed with

the Court, and therefore the Court hereby orders that the
original deposition be filed with the Clerk and since all three
of counsel have referred to the Deposition and quoted from it,
the Court will assume that those quotes are in accordance with
the original.
A-l

The facts relative to the issuance of summons are
not in dispute.

The Complaint in this matter was filed on

September 1, 1988, and on October 19, 1988, Mr. Schwartz, the
then attorney for the plaintiff, gave Summonses to Steven F.
Jackson, who was an employee of the firm with which Mr. Schwartz
was associated, and that at the time the Summonses were given
to him he was told to hold off and to not serve the Summonses
and Complaint because the plaintiff was in the process of
obtaining new counsel.
In July of 1989, Mr. Copier, plaintiff's present
counsel, contacted Mr. Jackson and told him to proceed with
service.

Mr. Jackson then sent one Summons to New Jersey for

service and sent the other Summons to Grand County, Utah, for
service, and the two Summonsed were served during the month of
July, 1989.
These undisputed facts are found within the
Deposition of Mr. Jackson and the Affidavit of Mr. Schwartz
that is on file with the Court.
Under this state of facts, there is no doubt in the
Court's mind that the plaintiff did fail to comply with the
provisions of Rule 4, in that the Summons was not issued as is
required under that Rule.

The Rule requires that the Summons

must issue within three months of the date of the filing of the
Complaint, and states that a Summons shall be deemed to have
A-2

been issued when placed in the hands of a qualified person for
the purpose of service.

The facts show that the Summons was

placed in the hands of a qualified person who was instructed
not to serve the Summons and, therefore, it was not in the
person's hands for the purpose of being served.

To rule

otherwise would make the provisions of Rule 4(b) ineffective
and meaningless.
THEREFORE, the Motions of the defendants are granted
and the Court will enter an order dismissing this action for
failure to comply with the Rules relative to service of summons.
DATED this

-> ^ - day of January, 1990.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY That I mailed true and correct copies of
the foregoing

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

by

depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid,
to the following:
Roger P. Christensen
Karra J. Porter
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN St POWELL
Attorneys at Law
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, UT
84101
Robert H. Copier
Attorney at Law
243 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Shawn E. Draney
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT
84145
DATED this

S>^GL

day of January, 1990

/5L*.: %fi<
Secretary
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
EVELYN MUIR, LINDA MUIR,
DEANNE PFEIFFER, SANDRA
JENKINS, MARK MUIR, MARLO
JENKINS and DOUGLAS BAILEY,

1
1
)
I

RULING ON MOTION OF APACHE
POWDER TO DISMISS
THE COMPLAINT AND
AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

]

W.H. BURT EXPLOSIVES, INC., a
New Mexico corporation and
APACHE POWDER COMPANY, a
New Jersey corporation,
Defendants.

]
]
]

Civil No. 5873

]

The defendant, Apache Powder, has filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint in this case, and the Amended Complaint,
and the plaintiffs have filed an Objection to the Motion, and
both parties have submitted their Memorandums of Legal Points
and Authorities that the Court has considered, and the Court
rules on the Motion as here and after stated.
The Court will not get into the issue of the
sufficiency of the service on Apache since this defendant
has appeared in this case by way of a Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint and the Amended Complaint, and those Motions were
filed on February 20, 1990.

A-5

In addition, the lack of proper service is not
usually grounds for dismissal but may result in an order
quashing the Return of Service, but nothing more.
The facts in this case show that the Complaint was
filed on November 27, 1989, and at that time an identical
case was pending before this Court, Civil No, 5719; that it
included all of the present plaintiffs except Virginia Lowe;
and that it involved the same cause of action.
Based upon this fact alone, this case should be
dismissed as to all plaintiffs except Virginia Lowe.
Procedurally you cannot maintain two actions involving the
same parties and the same cause of action at one time.
Civil Case No. 5719 was not dismissed until January
5, 1990, and the plaintiffs in that case have filed a Notice
of Appeal and the Appeal is now pending before the Appellate
Court.
However, the Court will further consider whether or
not the claims of all defendants are barred by the Statute of
Limitations as it applies to the wrongful death action even
if the Complaint in this case were properly filed.
There is no doubt that this cause of action for
wrongful death is subject to a two year Statute of Limitation,
and that the cause of action accrued in September of 1986,
and the Complaint was filed in November of 1989.

A-6

It is the opinion of this Court that, for the
purpose of interpreting Section 78-12-40, an action that is
timely filed under Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
but which is not followed by timely issuance and service of
process under Rule 4, is not timely commenced under that
"savings" Statute.
Otherwise, the whole purpose of Statutes of
Limitation could be defeated by the mere filing of a
Complaint with no further effort being made to bring the
action to conclusion before the Court.
Therefore, the Motion of Apache to Dismiss the
Complaint and the Amended Complaint as to them is hereby
granted, and the attorney for Apache is directed to prepare
a formal order in accordance with this opinion.
DATED this

_ ^ day of March, 1990.

';

,:/

BOYD BUNNELL, District Judge

0016M
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing

RULING ON MOTION OF APACHE POWDER TO DISMISS

THE COMPLAINT AND AMENDED COMPLAINT

by depositing the same

in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:

Robert H. Copier
Attorney at Law
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City UT
84111
Robert P. Christensen
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys at Law
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
H. James Clegg
Shawn E. Draney
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City UT 84145
DATED t h i s

/w>C

d a y of M a r c h ,
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1990.
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
1
DOUGLAS BAILEY, EVELYN MUIR,
DEANNA PFEIFFER, SANDRA JENKINS, )
MARK MUIR, MARLO JENKINS,
LINDA MUIR, AND VIRGINIA LOWE,

RULING ON OBJECTION
TO ORDER

Plaintiffs, ;
vs.

]

APACHE POWDER COMPANY, a
Nov/ Jersey corporation,
\7. H. BURT EXPLOSIVES, INC.
a New Mexico corporation,
and JOHN DOES I-X,

]
]
]
j
I

Civil No. 5873

Defendants. ]
The defendant, Apache Powder Company, has submitted to
the Court a proposed Order of Dismissal in accordance with the
Court's prior Memorandum Decision, and the plaintiffs, Douglas
Bailey and Evelyn Muir, have filed an Objection to the Proposed
Order.

Both parties have submitted their memorandums relative

to the Proposed Order and the Court has considered the same.
The Court hereby denies the objection and has on this
date signed the Proposed Order as submitted, and finds that it
is in accordance with the Court's prior Memorandum Decision.
DATED this <</ -^

day of April, 1990.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing

RULING ON OBJECTION TO ORDER

by depositing

the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Robert H. Copier
Attorney at Law
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City UT
84107
H. James Clegg
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City UT
84145
Roger P. Christensen
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneyj at Law
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

DATED this J?7L*t

day of April, 1990.

Secretary
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SEVEN 1H,V- PIOT r^Mf?T
Roger P. Christensen, 0648
Karra J. Porter, 5223
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE
DOUGLAS BAILEY, EVELYN MUIR,
DEANNA PFEIFFER, SANDRA
JENKINS, MARK MUIR, MARLO
JENKINS, LINDA MUIR, and
VIRGINIA LOWE,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
APACHE POWDER COMPANY, a New
Jersey corporation; W.H. EURT
EXPLOSIVES, INC., a New Mexico
corporation; and JOHN DOES I-X,

Civil No. 5873

Defendants.
This matter became before the Court on defendant W. H.
Burt Explosives, Inc.fs motion to dismiss.

The plaintiffs and

defendant W. H. Burt submitted memoranda and requested a ruling.
After reviewing the parties1 memoranda, the Court grants W. H.
Burtfs motion, for the reasons set forth in its Ruling on Motion
of Apache Powder's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and Amended
Complaint issued on March 16, 1990.
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Therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

All wrongful death claims raised in the Complaint and

Amended Complaint are barred by the statute of limitations and
are dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits.
2.

The remainder of the claims raised in the Complaint

and Amended Complaint are hereby dismissed without prejudice.
DATED this

/ / day of April, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

^ ' ^ - - w ^ V

Honorable >#byd B u n n e l l
D i s t r i c t / C o u r t rfudge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the 12

day of April, 1990,

true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL was
mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Robert C. Copier
Attorney for Plaintiffs
243 East 400 South, #200

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Shawn E. Draney
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Apache Powder Company
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
EVELYN MUIR, LINDA MUIR,
]i
DEANNA PFEIFFER, SANDRA JENKINS,;)
MARK MUIR, MARLO JENKINS, and
;)
DOUGLAS BAILEY,
;
Plaintiffs,
vs.

RULING ON PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

]
;

APACHE POWDER COMPANY,
a New Jersey corporation,
W.H. BURT EXPLOSIVES, INC.,
a New Mexico corporation,
and JOHN DOES I-X,

|
;
]
]
]

Civil No. 5873

Defendants. ;
The plaintiffs, Douglas Bailey and Evelyn Muir, have
filed a motion for relief from the Order of Dismissal entered
by the Court in this case.

They have supported their Motion

with a Memorandum of Legal Points and Authorities which the
Court has considered and read.
The Memorandum states matters which the Court has
already considered and presents nothing new to the Court.
The Statute of Limitations as to plaintiff Douglas Bailey had
run at the time of the filing of this action, and Civil Case
No. 5719 involving the same parties and the same subject matter
pertaining to the case of Evelyn Muir is still pending and is
on appeal and therefore, this case could not be maintained by
her.

No case is finally disposed of until such time as the

appeal is determined.
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Therefore, the Court denies the Motion of these
plaintiffs, and will not set aside the Order of Dismissals
heretofore entered,
DATED this i^f/

2£day of April, 1990,

fecfrD BUlTOEiiL, D i s t r i c t
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Judge'

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing

RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

by depositing the same in the United

States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Robert H. Copier
Attorney at Law
243 East 400 Scutih, Suite 200
Salt Lake City UT
84111
Shawn E. Draney
Attorney at Law
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City UT
84145
Roger P. Christensen
Attorney at Law
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City UT
84101

&tf/ day

DATED this ^J^ZA/

/

/Z&</IA/

U/AJL

of April, 1990.

Secretary
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Arh „

ROBERT H. COPIER - #727
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Douglas Bailey and Evelyn Muir
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-0099

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DOUGLAS BAILEY, EVELYN MUIR
(Appellant), DEANNA PFEIFFER,
SANDRA JENKINS, HARK MUIR,
MARLO JENKINS, LINDA MUIR,
and VIRGINIA LOWE,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 5873

vs.
APACHE POWDER COMPANY,
a New Jersey corporation,
W.H. BURT EXPLOSIVES, INC.,
a New Mexico corporation,
and JOHN DOES I-X,
Defendants.

The Plaintiff Evelyn Muir, by and through her attorney,
Robert H. Copier, hereby gives notice of her appeal taken to
the Utah Supreme Court from the Seventh Judicial District
Court, for Grand County, State of Utah, of the Order of
Dismissal signed by the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, District Court
Judge, on the 2nd day of April, 1990, together with the Court's
denial of the motion to set aside the order on the 24th day of
April, 1990.
DATED this cx '
day of ApriLr-> 1990.

iff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE QT MAILING
This is to certify that a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Notice of Appeal was nailed, postage prepaid,
this rv*"7
day of April, 1990, to Shawn E. Draney, attorney
for Defendant Apache Powder Company, at 10 Exchange Place, 11th
Floor, P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145, and Karra
j. Porter, attorney for Defendant W.H. Burt Explosives, Inc.,
at 175 South West Temple, Suite 510, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101.

muirl.not
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the

day of December, 1990,

four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
W. H. BURT EXPLOSIVES, INC. were mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Robert H. Copier
Attorney for Muir
243 East 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Shawn E. Draney
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Apache Powder Company
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Roger P. Christensen
Karra J. Porter

